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Bringing the Organization Back In:
The Role of Bureaucratic Churning in Early
TANF Caseload Declines in Illinois
CHAD BROUGHTON

Public Policy Studies
The University of Chicago
Welfare reform legislationin the late 1990s lead to rapid declines in
state welfare caseloads. In contrast to prevailingaccounts that emphasize rapidjob creationand those that pin caseloaddeclines on successful work incentives and behavioralsanctions, this articleargues
that organizationalrationingmechanisms explain a large portion
of the sharp initial declines in Illinois. The articlefirst highlights
how street-level bureaucraticpracticesorientedtoward caseload reduction arose in TANF implementing bodies from a reorderedand
narrowset of organizationalincentives that had little to do with the
symbolic goals of welfare reform. Based on an analysis of state-level
administrativestatistics andformal interviewing andfieldwork in
welfare offices and community-based organizations, this article
finds that bureaucraticchurning,gate-keeping, and other forms of
service rationingsignificantlysped exits from and slowed entrances
to welfare in the decisivefirst three years of TANF implementation.
Key words: welfare reform, poverty, organizations,policy implementation, churning

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) initiated a fundamental reorganization of the U.S. welfare system away from entitlementbased assistance and towards time-limited, work-oriented temporary assistance. Replacing Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), the new Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) block grant aimed to foster self-sufficiency
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and personal responsibility and end long-term welfare dependency among the welfare poor. Since implementation began,
welfare caseloads, to the astonishment of observers across
the political spectrum, have dropped at unprecedented rates.
According to the Administration for Children and Families, the
total family caseload in Illinois decreased from 188,069 in July
1997 (Administration for Children and Families [ACF], 2008a),
the first month of TANF implementation, to 72,175 in July 2000
(ACF, 2008b), a remarkable decrease of 115,894 or 61.6 percent,
in three years. As of March 2008, the total number of families
receiving TANF cash assistance was 24,559, a startling 86.9%
reduction from the initial TANF figure (ACF, 2008c). ACF lists
Illinois as third, behind only Oklahoma and the District of
Columbia, in caseload reduction percentage since enactment
(ACF, 2008c).
Post-TANF literature reviews point inconclusively to the
policy changes of welfare reform, non-welfare policy changes,
the sustained economic expansion, and interaction effects as
reasons for the caseload reductions, and note the wide variation across the literature in regards to which causal factors are
emphasized (Bell, 2001; Blank, 2002; Danziger, 1999; Primus
et al., 1999). Some studies have emphasized the relative importance of economic over policy-related factors (Klerman &
Danielson, 2004; Klerman & Haider, 2004). Many studies of the
post-TANF era, however, contend that policy-related changes
played a more significant role in the accelerated caseload
decline of the late 1990s (Moffitt, 1999, 2001; Schoeni & Blank,
2000; U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, 1997, 1999).
Conservative commentators have argued that caseload declines are the result of rigorous policy changes that demand
more from the poor. Rector and Youssef (1999) and Michael
New (2002, 2006) claim that the strength of state sanctioning
policies played a much larger role than the strength of the state
economy and state TANF benefits levels in forcing caseload
numbers down. Likewise, Robert Moffitt (2003) argues that
nonfinancial factors, including work and other requirements,
sanctions, and diversion were primary causal forces in caseload reductions. And to explain caseload declines in Wisconsin,
Lawrence Mead (1998) concludes that the "main instrument of
change" was "public authority" and concluded, "politics, not
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economics, remains the master science" (p. 31).
The post-TANF welfare system of the late 1990s was also
characterized by a broader array of work supports, including
childcare and transportation support, the delinking of Medicaid
from cash assistance, expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, and an increase in the federal minimum wage to $5.15
per hour in 1997. These policy factors have received less attention as possible determinants of TANF caseload declines, in
part because of the complexity of measuring their effects. For
instance, in evaluating the EITC as a positive work incentive,
economic studies have found that the EITC increases labor
force participation (Dickert, Hauser, & Scholz, 1995; Eissa &
Hoynes, 2005; Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Liebman, 2002; Meyer &
Rosenbaum, 1999, 2000). However, these studies are able only,
as one study puts it, to "imply a reduction in transfer program
participation" (Dickert et al., 1995, p. 42).
As Bell (2001) notes, none of these studies have been able
to convincingly "tie caseload declines to individual welfare
reform components" (p. ii) such as time limits, work sanctions,
earning disregards, work requirements, family caps, tightened
work exemptions, or related non-welfare policy changes. Even
tentative findings of strong policy influence have later been
called into question by new methods, models, and assumptions. Important as they are, these studies ought to be considered "first-level analyses" (p. 59) because they are limited by
methodological constraints, including their reliance on aggregate state-level data and key modeling assumptions.
Despite problems pinning down the reasons, TANF implementation clearly has had a dramatic impact on welfare caseloads independent of the sustained economic expansion of the
late 1990s and non-TANF policy changes. My argument asserts
that the reason analysts cannot specify the policy factors that
drove caseload decline is because critical policy differences between states and localities cannot be easily coded and
modeled. As such, prevailing evaluative models, useful as
they are, overlook the street-level mechanisms of the policy
implementation process that helped to produce these dramatic
results.
In this article I employ a mixed methods approach to
the puzzle of the rapid, early caseload declines in Illinois. I
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examine state-level administrative statistics for a broad overview of caseload movement and then draw upon two years
of ethnographic fieldwork and interviewing in communitybased, welfare-to-work organizations and local area welfare
offices to examine the initial period of TANF implementation
from 1997 to 2000. In my research I attended a month-long,
full-day welfare-to-work program in two community-based
organizations (CBOs), attended one year of meetings of CBO
leaders at the Chicago Jobs Council, and interviewed twelve
caseworkers and mid- to high-level administrators at the
Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS). Additionally,
I conducted 20 formal, in-depth interviews with low-income
women in their homes after the welfare-to-work programs we
attended were complete. Likewise, in informal conversations
during small group outings to McDonald's, the welfare office,
or on errands to K-mart, participants reflected on their experience of welfare reform with each other and with me. During
this two-year period, I also interacted with welfare-to-work
participants and service deliverers as an adult literacy volunteer in the two CBOs I studied. This mixed methodology
highlights the limitations of conventional policy analysis that
relies on testing the discrete "inputs" and "outputs" of policy.
By "bringing the organization back in," my analysis provides
a unique vantage point from which to view the "black box" of
implementation; that is, how policy results are achieved by and
in organizations.
In this article I first contend that it is necessary to examine
organizational incentives and rationing mechanisms to understand fully how TANF caseloads dropped in such remarkable
numbers in such a short period of time. In this first section
I demonstrate how PRWORA reordered organizational and
individual incentives at IDHS, local area welfare offices, and
community-based organizations. Though based on high rhetoric of improving the character and circumstances of the poor,
implementing this vision required dramatic simplifications to
make the welfare poor "legible" to the state. These simplifications set welfare reform on a particular trajectory that ignored
the complexities of the lives of the poor and set the bureaucratic mechanisms of reform in motion, searching out the most
efficient means to achieve its narrow ends. I then examine the
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initial phases of TANF implementation in Illinois and demonstrate that welfare recipients were shed from cash assistance
rolls largely through bureaucratic churning, gate-keeping,
and other forms of service rationing that sped exits from and
slowed entrances to TANF. These organizational processes,
because they are difficult to quantify, go largely unmeasured
in most analyses of TANF caseload declines. This analysis,
then, entreats welfare scholars to consider how the state "saw"
the poor during the initial reform and how its implementing
bodies made this vision a reality at the street-level. Further, it
questions arguments that claim women left the rolls because
of increased income or because they had learned the "moral
lessons" of PRWORA. Finally, I discuss the social implications
of welfare reform for low-income women and children given
how caseload declines were achieved.
The Post-PRWORA Organizational Incentive Structure:
IDHS, Local Area Offices, and Community-Based
Organizations
Though based on ideals of improving the character (for
conservatives) or circumstances (for liberals) of poor people,
welfare reform was ill-equipped to address either. If taken seriously, the goals of welfare reform are utopian in scope, assuming a transformative power of the state to reengineer the poor
into self-sufficient, responsible, obedient, and, consequently,
upwardly mobile subjects. As James C. Scott argues in Seeing
Like a State, such sweeping ambitions for the nation-state have
emerged only recently historically, but are now commonplace
(Scott, 1998, p. 92). These bold interventions, however, require
massive simplifications so the target population is "legible" to
state officials. "Seeing like a state" necessitates the creation of
abridged maps that do not "successfully represent the actual
activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended
to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer" (Scott, 1998, p. 3). These maps, when allied with
state power, allow the reality they depict to be remade in a
particular way. In the case of welfare reform, the complexities
of the lives of the welfare-reliant poor were ultimately seen
by the state in the narrow terms of work participation rates
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and caseload reduction quotas. These abridged maps and their
corresponding performance metrics and incentives set TANF
implementing bodies searching out the most efficient means to
achieve their narrow ends.
Though PRWORA devolved power to states, it set out
rigorous objectives concerning work participation rates and
caseload reductions that redefined the incentive structure for
the Illinois Department of Human Services, local area welfare
offices, and community-based organizations. In 1997, the first
year of implementation, 25 percent of the TANF caseload had
to be participating in "employment-related activities" for a
minimum of 20 hours per week. A state could have its allocation
of federal funds reduced if it failed to meet work participation
rates. There was, however, an important way in which states
could significantly lower these requirements. For every percentage point a state lowered its TANF caseload, a percentage
point was taken off the work participation rate requirement.
That is, if a state lowered its caseload 15 percent in the first
year, it lowered it work participation rate requirement from
25 percent to 10 percent. The law demanded, therefore, that
states either put a certain percentage of their caseload to work
or reduce their caseload by so many percentage points, which
counted as the same thing. The legislation, therefore, posed a
rather straightforward choice for state and local welfare administrators: do something that is onerous and expensive (prepare
low-skilled, mostly single mothers for work and place them
in jobs) or something that is quick and inexpensive (canceling
cases through tightening and strictly enforcing eligibility rules
and other rationing methods).
In the 1990s community-based organizations were entrusted with a much broader role in the delivery of welfare-towork services (Salamon, 1995). Their close involvement with
state welfare administrations, however, has circumscribed
their organizational autonomy and has aligned their organizational interests with those of the state (Smith & Lipsky, 1993).
While some states paid CBOs on a cost-reimbursement basis,
in Illinois there was a dramatic move toward "pay-per-performance" or "performance-based" contracting in the 1990s.
Contracts were designed to hold community-based providers
accountable for each client referred to them and to ensure that
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they were "responsive to IDHS's quotas and demands," according to the IDHS administrator in charge of state contracts with
CBOs. Providers that "billed out"-that met all of the terms
of their contract by placing people in jobs or at least getting
them off the rolls-were preferred and given more referrals.
In the initial years of implementation, IDHS revised contracts
each year to include less funding for longer-term services (e.g.,
adult literacy, mental health counseling, domestic violence
programs, substance abuse programs) and more for "quick attachment" or "work first" job readiness programs. And since
IDHS writes, arbitrates, and monitors its contracts with CBOs,
service providers had little bargaining power. With these incentives in place, both sets of actors had an organizational
stake in cycling welfare recipients quickly through welfare-towork channels, rather than educational or social service providers, to meet statistical and financial demands as defined
under PRWORA. In one Chicago survey, for instance, only one
of 358 non-working welfare clients was referred to a domestic
violence agency, while 164 were sent to job search workshops.
Only eight were referred to substance abuse programs and two
to mental health services, while 113 were sent to job readiness
skills training workshops (Work, Welfare, & Families, 2000).
The incentive structure established under PRWORA, therefore, was designed to trim caseloads regardless of whether or
not welfare recipients were moving toward economic self-sufficiency. The symbolic ideals of personal responsibility and
self-sufficiency served the implementing bodies well in public
relations efforts touting welfare reform's "success stories." But
those ideals remained abstractions to organizational actors at
the state and street-levels attempting to meet the immediate
and tangible demands of caseload reduction and work participation rate goals, and to community-based organizations attempting to "bill out" and survive under the bold new system.
These organizational incentives and processes have been
largely neglected in the academic and political discourse on
TANF implementation.
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Illinois Caseload Reductions and Bureaucratic Churning
The Illinois Department of Human Services, its local
welfare offices, and community-based providers began operating under a refashioned set of organizational incentives that
guided early implementation and produced dramatic caseload
reductions. This section examines IDHS caseload figures from
Table 1. Activities Affecting Caseload, Illinois Department of
Human Services, 1997-2000
Additions

Subtractions
Other

New
Reinstatements

New
Approvals

Canceled for
Earned Income

Other
Cancels

Total for Fiscal Year

91,336

41,902

43,056

119,403

% of Additions/Subtractions

68.6%

31.4%

26.5%

73.5%

Additions:

133,238

Subtractions:

162,459

Reinstatements

New
Approvals

Canceled for
Earned Income

Other
Cancels

Total for Fiscal Year

95,218

27,443

53,929

116,586

% of Additions/Subtractions

77.6%

22.4%

31.6%

68.4%

Additions:

122,661

Subtractions:

170,515

Reinstatements

New
Approvals

Canceled for
Earned Income

Other
Cancels

Totalfor Period

34,322

16,789

31,823

39,771

% of Additions/Subtractions

67.2%

32.8%

44.4%

55.6%

Additions:

51,111

Subtractions:

71,594

July 1997 - June 1998

Yearly totals

Net Illinois caseload reduction for year: 29,221
July 1997 - June 1998

Yearly totals

Net Illinois caseload reduction for year: 47,854
July 1999 - March 2000

Period totals

Net Illinois caseload reduction for period: 20,483
NOTE: Author's calculations based on data from the Illinois Department of Human
Services (IDHS 2000). These figures vary slightly with those referenced above from
the Administration for Children and Families.
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July 1997 to March 2000 and shows that the stunning declines
were to a large extent the result of bureaucratic churning-an
organizational dynamic set loose by policy reform, but largely
overlooked in prevailing approaches that test the impact of
state differences in program rules on TANF declines.
The IDHS administrative data presented in Table 1 shows a
net reduction of 29,221 cases in the Illinois TANF caseload in the
first year of implementation. The work-related closings-those
canceled for earned income (43,056)-were nearly the same as
new approvals (41,902) in the first year. This equivalence suggests that labor force participation levels were steady among
poor single mothers in Illinois during that year and also that
TANF diversion strategies were not yet in place at local offices
on the entry end. "Other cancellations"-denoting a recipient
who was removed from the rolls for reasons other than an increase in her income, often for "noncooperation"-made up
the vast majority of cancellations. The net difference between
these administrative case closings (119,403) and the number of
cases reinstated (91,336) accounts for almost the entire caseload
reduction in the first year of 29,221 (IDHS, 2000). The figures in
Table 1 show that administrative case closings and subsequent
reinstatements-an organizational process I call bureaucratic
churning, examined in the subsequent section-were very
common in the initial three years.
Notably, churning from the rolls increased when local
welfare offices were under yearly performance pressure. In
June 1998, the last month of the first year of welfare reform, administrative case closings shot up to an unprecedented 16,949,
70.3 percent above the average monthly cancellation rate for
the year (9,950). The first two months of TANF implementation
also show high levels of administrative case closings: 15,140
in July 1997 and 11,069 in August 1997. The other high cancellation month was May 1998 at 10,974, suggesting that local
offices were gearing up to meet yearly performance measures
in the penultimate month of the fiscal year (IDHS, 2000).
Cycling in and out of welfare is a well-documented and
long-standing phenomenon (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Edin
& Lein, 1997; Harris, 1996; Pavetti, 1993). Cycling, however,
implies some volition on the part of the welfare recipient,
and the time scale considered in these studies is much longer,
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typically years. In bureaucratic churning, which might be considered an accelerated and organizationally imposed form
of cycling, cancellations and reinstatements happen quickly,
often within a week. And while welfare-reliant women were
churned off the welfare rolls pre-TANF, caseload data show
that churning accelerated dramatically after the implementation of TANF in July 1997, as Table 2 indicates. Even as the
TANF caseload shrank post-reform, the absolute number of
case cancellations and reinstatements increased. Consequently,
the percentage of women on the welfare rolls being forced to
cycle increased dramatically.
Table 2: Pre- and Post-TANF Comparison of Churning
Year

Cases Discontinued as Cases Approved/Reinstated as
%of Total Caseload
%of Total Caseload

1994

42.1%

45.4%

1995

49.4%

44.9%

1996

63.5%

53.3%

1997

95.3%

71.1%

1998

108.2%

86.5%

1999

142.4%

100.5%

NOTE: Author's calculations based on September figures from each year using
several sources (ACF, 2008d; IDHS, 1998b; IDHS, 2000).

The Chicago-based National Center on Poverty Law
(NCPL), which conducted an intensive study of caseload reductions during TANF's first two years, wrote the following:
There is a disturbing trend of aid terminations for
disciplinary reasons ("noncooperation" of one kind or
another). About 8,000-10,000 cases per month are cut
off for one of these reasons. Around 70 percent of these
are reinstated ... but this still leaves about 2,000-3,000

monthly disciplinary terminations that are not. (Illinois
Welfare News, 1999a)
Cherlin, Bogen, Quane, & Burton (2002) found similar
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results in their Chicago survey. Sixty-two percent of their respondents who had been canceled for missing an appointment-which was the most common official cause-later had
their benefits reinstated. In fact, many TANF cases were canceled and reinstated multiple times in a single year. Indeed,
as Table 1 shows there were 235,989 administrative case closings in the first two years of TANF implementation, significantly higher than the entire Illinois caseload at the beginnings
of the reforms: 188,069. In large part because of the extensive
use of bureaucratic churning, then, the Illinois TANF caseload
was cut in half in less than three years as low-income women
were shed from the rolls largely for reasons other than "earned
income."
Speeding Exits, Shedding Clients: Bureaucratic
Churning from a Street-Level Perspective
To look inside the "black box" of the implementation
process (Palumbo & Calista, 1990) that produced these stunning policy outcomes in Illinois, this section examines TANF
implementation from the perspective of IDHS administrators,
local area office managers and caseworkers, and welfare recipients. As Michael Lispky (1980) writes, policy implementation
analysis must start "from an understanding of the working
conditions and priorities of those who deliver policy" (p. 25),
and, likewise, of policy's targets. I have examined in the previous sections the post-PRWORA organizational incentives as
they emerged from the simplifications of modem statecraft
and the statistical results in the Illinois TANF caseload, and
will now examine the street-level processes that sped welfare
exits to achieve those results.
Administrative case closings were a central determinant
of caseload declines in Illinois, especially in the decisive early
years of implementation. And central to the administrative
case closing was what local offices termed a "call-in." Welfare
caseworkers would "call-in" their entire case list, usually not
by phone but by mail, for a case redetermination, which often
entailed completing and signing a Responsibility and Services
Plan (Cherlin et al., 2002, also notes this process in Chicago).
If a welfare recipient missed the appointment scheduled in
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the letter, refused to answer caseworker questions, or failed
to attend the mandatory work program to which they were
assigned, her case could be canceled for noncompliance. This
call-in process (a form of bureaucratic churning) was a standard practice in local offices and led to the majority of disciplinary cancellations.
At meetings at the Chicago Jobs Council (CJC), the umbrella organization for welfare-to-work CBOs in Chicago, administrative case closings were a major topic of discussion during
the first two years of TANF implementation. In these meetings
directors of these community-based service provision agencies
shared and corroborated common anecdotes about women
who had their cases canceled because of a missed appointment
or for failing to divulge the name and whereabouts of their
child's father. Others noted that women suffering in abusive
relationships or from mental illnesses or addictions were also
unfairly terminated and not referred to the appropriate social
services. Not infrequently, cases would be canceled because a
woman was required to be at a workplace, community service
location, or CBO work program at the same time she was required to come to the local welfare office for her case redetermination or other appointment. There were also regular
complaints about cases taking months to be reinstated, resulting miwomen missing rent payments and having to find other
sources of income.
Furthermore, CBO leaders in Chicago reported that caseworkers had been frequently canceling cases for improper
reasons either deliberately or because they misunderstood the
new rules. An account published by the National Center on
Poverty Law and a report by a Chicago anti-poverty alliance
both substantiated the CBO directors' claims about disciplinary cancellations (Illinois Welfare News, 1999b; Work, Welfare,
&Families, 2000). Likewise, Cherlin et al. (2002), one of the few
academic studies to countenance this pervasive problem, found
that the most common reasons for procedural case closing and
sanctions in Chicago, "[were] bureaucratic: missing a meeting
or failing to produce required forms or documents" (p. 402).
Though aligned with the state in their interest to cycle
welfare recipients quickly through welfare-to-work channels,
CBO leaders were critical of administrative case closings, which
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they considered unfair to poor women and also against their
organizational interest in maintaining a steady stream of TANF
clients. The perspective at local welfare offices and among state
administrators regarding disciplinary cancellations and churning was quite the opposite. One high-level administrator from
the Humboldt Park local area office, "Mary," spoke enthusiastically about call-ins. Her office was competing with another
local area office, Northwest, for the largest TANF caseload reductions among the 26 Cook County local offices. She said the
Northwest office had implemented a "serious plan" that had
produced "incredible caseload reduction results." That office's
caseload was reduced from 5,654 on August 12, 1998 to 4,752 a
month later on September 12, 1998-a 16 percent reduction in
just one month as a result of an aggressive office-wide call-in
effort. Mary's Humboldt Park office achieved similar marked
reductions through call-ins, tightened eligibility and instituted tougher procedures and work requirements. She spoke
enthusiastically about changes in the welfare system saying
"everybody loves this," "it's the best thing that's happened to
everybody," and "it's the one political thing that nobody can
protest." She said that her staff "is really sold on it"-so much
so, in fact, that "it's not like work." On bulletin boards around
her office, Mary put up cheerful congratulatory, inspirational
signs, and colorful graphs comparing local area office performance. Highlighting the Humboldt Park office on one such
graph, Mary affixed gold stars (the kind elementary students
get on their homework) and backslapping exclamations like,
"Excellent work!" She said the environment was now better
than in the 1960s and 1970s when "everybody was demanding
everything as their right." Regarding administrative case closings Mary said, "The people who were kicked off for non-cooperation who do not come back must have gotten something
else."
Though the initial response to welfare reform amongst
caseworkers was mixed (Bell, 2005; Danziger & Seefeldt, 2000;
Morgen, 2001), many expressed concern about the changes
that came with TANF. A caseworker I interviewed, "Joe," who
had worked for 25 years in a welfare office on Chicago's North
Side, reported that things were "really bad" in his office. He
said that caseworkers felt pressure to kick people off on "any
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technicality to look good to their supervisors and the new
office administrator," whom he described as a "hawk." Joe
maintained that there were some "real soap opera stories."
One story was about a homeless person who was asked to
bring in a tax return from the previous year as proof of having
no income. The person could not produce the form and was
dropped from the rolls. Canceling a case for non-compliance,
whatever the justification, was by far the easiest means, Joe
said, for a caseworker to meet the onerous caseload reduction
quotas they faced. Supporting this contention, Wendy Pollack,
a poverty policy lawyer from the NCPL said at a CJC meeting,
"a case cancellation is easier than a redetermination of benefits
or a sanction, which involves messy due process."
In my fieldwork, I found that welfare recipients who had
been churned off the rolls on "disciplinary" grounds presented
a variety of reasons for not trying to return to welfare. Some
indeed had "gotten something else" (i.e., formal or informal
work) and had chosen not to return to welfare because they
thought they would no longer qualify for cash assistance or
because they were too busy with their current job. Several expressed how much they feared the call-ins and the intimidating redetermination interviews that they had to attend every
six months since TANF was implemented. While many fought
to maintain eligibility, a number of interviewees refused to put
up with the heightened hurdles and indignities involved in
obtaining and maintaining benefits since the reforms. These
women were churned off the rolls.
When it reached low-income women, PRWORA, ostensibly aimed at reengineering the character and circumstances of
the poor, had in practice become a one dimensional organizational imperative to shed clients. Welfare reform's grand vision
of reengineering the individual had become operationalized
in a "legible and administratively convenient format" (Scott,
1998, p. 3)-the metric of caseload reductions. Implementing
bodies consequently mobilized their organizational processes
around this narrow measure. As this analysis shows, looking
at and inside the organization allows a glimpse beyond
policy rhetoric and program rules to the difficult-to-quantify practices-including call-ins, improper cancellations, and
bureaucratic hurdles-that sped an unprecedented number of
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exits from TANF.
Slowing Entrances: Gate-Keeping from a
Street-Level Perspective
Though bureaucratic diversion is difficult to measure as a
causal factor in caseload declines (Mayer, 2000; Mead, 1998),
there is a substantial, but often overlooked literature on how
organizational mechanisms, even in the absence of policy
changes, can be used to adjust the supply and demand of
social services at the street-level (Brodkin, 1997; Lipsky, 1980;
Prottas, 1979; Weissert, 1994). Given increased autonomy for
states and the more rigorous organizational incentive scheme
under TANF, there is indeed evidence of substantial organizational change in welfare offices (Hays, 2003; Ridzi & London,
2006) and more caseworker "buy in" (Ridzi, 2004) to reduce
rolls in large part by enhancing what Lawrence Mead calls the
"hassle" component of welfare reform (Mead, 2002). And just
as IDHS employed street-level churning to speed exits from
the welfare rolls, it similarly slowed entrances to TANF by
implementing new procedural and psychological obstacles on
the entry end. Organizational gate-keeping slowed entry by
tightening eligibility requirements and erecting new barriers
such as responsibility contracts, drug screenings, mandatory
child support cooperation, and diversionary workshops. As a
result of new procedural hurdles, psychological barriers (e.g.,
frustration, stigma) to entry and maintenance of cash assistance have likewise increased (Anderson, Halter, & Gryzlak,
2004; Meyers & Lurie, 2005; Zedlewski & Nelson, 2003).
IDHS statistics suggest that local welfare offices were primarily focused on shedding existing welfare recipients from
the rolls in its first year. In the second year, however, IDHS
began to focus on slowing entrance as well. As Table 1 demonstrates, "new approval" numbers declined dramatically in
the second and third years as diversion strategies were implemented. It was common knowledge among welfare managers
and caseworkers, community-based organization workers,
and welfare recipients that there were increasingly strict procedural obstructions to joining the welfare rolls after TANF.
"Gerry," a contract specialist at IDHS, said that IDHS initiated
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a "uniform front door policy" with TANF that compelled new
applicants to join employment and job search programs for a
month or more before they were eligible to receive benefits.
Sharon Hays (2003) discusses in ethnographic detail some
of the "diversionary workshops" that were established in 20
states in order to "'divert' prospective welfare clients from
ever completing the process of applying for welfare" (p. 104).
Across the U.S., this gate-keeping policy was so effective that
David Ellwood, welfare reform advisor to the Clinton administration, said, "It is virtually impossible to get on welfare since
the reforms" (Ellwood, 2000). As a result of these new roadblocks, many applicants give up. As "Beverly," the receptionist at a welfare-to-work organization on Chicago's South Side
said, "Whatever the welfare people [at IDHS] are doing, it's
working; because these women are fed up!"
Indeed, IDHS administrators engendered stigma strategically as a psychological barrier to entering or staying on
the TANF rolls. At a public symposium on welfare reform
in Illinois, James Dimas (2000), a high-level administrator at
IDHS, recounted a story about a woman he saw at a grocery
store who was embarrassed to use her food stamps. Of that
scene Dimas commented, "That embarrassment is not necessarily a bad thing-because we don't want kids growing up
worrying about food insecurity." Dimas repeated this message
several times, asserting plainly that IDHS was now promoting
social stigma as one of a variety of methods to keep welfare
recipients off the rolls. Dimas refashioned food stamps in these
statements as a cause of food insecurity rather than an antipoverty policy designed to alleviate it. Such a position suggests
that caseload reductions and cost containment are the agency's
primary goals-and that further promoting stigmatization of
assistance at the street-level is an effective and inexpensive organizational tactic in achieving those goals.
The dramatic decreases in new welfare approvals in 1998
and 1999 suggest that gate-keeping efforts served to maintain
the caseload reductions that had been achieved through administrative churning and earned income cancellations. These
findings are consistent with studies emphasizing the importance of lowered rates of entry in overall TANF declines (Acs,
Phillips, & Nelson, 2003; Grogger, Haider, & Klerman, 2003;

Bringing Organization Back In

171

Moffitt, 2003). Indeed, Moffitt (2003) finds significant diversionary effects for rather mundane street-level variables such
as: (1) "having to discuss a plan for getting by off welfare;" (2)
being discouraged or hassled; or (3) a recipient being told that
she would face a work requirement. The caseload reduction
literature in general, however, pays little attention to diversionary tactics and cannot measure adequately their strength
in implementation. For example, in Bell's (2001) review of caseload decline studies, he devotes only one paragraph to this organizational mechanism. As demonstrated in this section, my
fieldwork reveals that in official IDHS discourse and in client
experience, gate-keeping was an essential mechanism in the
production of post-TANF caseload declines in Illinois.
Cases Canceled Due to Earned Income:
Evidence of Success or Further Churning?
In its public relations materials, IDHS emphasized aggregate statistics about the number of cases canceled because of
earned income. An IDHS press release from 2000 boasted that
from July 1997 to May 2000, 134,857 families left TANF due
to earned income. As Table 3 indicates this figure is greater
than the overall caseload reduction figure of 99,668 from that
same time period, but much lower than the number of administrative case cancellations through March 2000: 275,760. The
earned income figure, meant to suggest a move to self-reliance,
is misleading and provides further evidence of administrative
churning of cases.
Table 3. IDHS Welfare Statistics, July 1997 - May 2000
Cases canceled due to earned income

134,857

Administrative case cancellations
(through March 2000)

275,760

Total caseload reduction

99,668

Several factors explain why earned income cancellations
were higher than the overall caseload reductions. First, new
welfare clients have joined and left the welfare rolls because
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of earned income since implementation, thus counting toward
earned income cancellations but not toward the net caseload reduction. As Table 1 shows, 86,134 new applications for
welfare benefits were approved from July 1997 to March 2000.
A portion of these new applicants was later canceled for earned
income and has stayed off welfare, reflecting the cycling that
has always characterized the welfare system. Second, an existing TANF case could be canceled for earned income and
return to the rolls. "Denise," for instance, who worked seasonally in a catalog distribution warehouse, was disqualified from
cash assistance for December and January because her income
surpassed the means test. In February, when her hours were
reduced and her income declined, Denise returned to TANF.
During the subsequent summer she worked selling funnel
cakes to downtown tourists and, once again, was forced off the
rolls. The next time Denise applied, however, she was referred
to a diversionary program and did not return to the welfare
rolls. Denise, then, showed up in IDHS statistics as reducing
the caseload by one, but showed up twice in aggregate statistics for earned income cancellations. In her case, churning
occurs within the "earned income cancellations" category.
Though earned income cancellations suggest that more poor
women are moving to economic self-sufficiency, this figure is
-ironically-artificially inflated by the poor quality, irregular, and seasonal jobs that increase the need to cycle between
welfare and work. Before PRWORA it was more likely that she
would have continued to cycle on and off welfare; in a new,
post-TANF world, Denise, like so many others, was eventually
churned off the rolls. The job market failed her both before and
after the reforms; what had changed were the organizational
processes governing the welfare-to-work dynamic that ended
her persistent cycling and left her to the whims of the lowwage labor market.
In addition to finding employment or being diverted from
reentry, a woman who was an "earned income cancellation"
that did not return to TANF could subsequently be: (1) unemployed and unwilling to reapply because of increased hassles;
(2) working part-time or irregularly and qualified for reduced
assistance but unwilling to reapply; (3) living outside Illinois;
or (4) living with a boyfriend and unemployed. While it is true
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that welfare recipients were leaving the rolls because of administrative and earned income cancellations in record numbers, it
is important not to assume "they found something," as TANF
implementing bodies tended to do, but rather to examine rigorously the jobs data and social implications of the dramatic
caseload declines.
Social Implications for Low-Income
Mothers and Children
In a 1998 press release, Governor Jim Edgar claimed victory
for Illinois welfare reform, calling it a "resounding success"
in which poor women were able to "move from dependency
and to self-sufficiency" and "appreciate the pride and independence that comes from earning a regular paycheck" (IDHS,
1998a). Likewise, President Clinton celebrated TANF success
stories in Chicago in 1999 in a welfare reform town meeting
(Hair, 1999). The media have generally adopted the case reduction metric for evaluating welfare reform, while very few
media stories have questioned the widespread sanctioning
and case cancellations (Schram & Soss, 2001). As this article
has demonstrated, caseload reduction and earned income cancellations figures-the evidence most often cited in public relations material-reveal very little about how poor women and
children have fared under the reforms. Nonetheless, these tools
of statecraft have effectively defined the discourse on welfare
reform. In a sense, the simplifications of the state have become
the media's simplifications.
A national survey of leaver studies found that between
51 and 81 percent of welfare leavers were employed. The employment figure was between 39 percent and 53 percent in
the four state studies that considered only people who left
welfare as a result of disciplinary cancellations. Of the employed, between 57 percent and 87 percent were working at
least 30 hours a week. Earnings data from these studies show
that, "the average leaver's earnings are below the poverty
level, and most leavers report having incomes that are lower
than or similar to their combined earnings and benefits before
exit" (Brauner & Loprest, 1999, p. 9). In Illinois, Julnes et al.
(2000) found that only 69 percent of leavers were employed at
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welfare exit, and, of those, only 37 percent held the same job
after one year and a very small percentage earned more than
the poverty threshold. Despite these dismal unemployment,
job turnover, and income outcomes among welfare leavers in
an expanding economy, 80% remained off cash assistance.
The present public policy package for the working poor
is significantly more generous than that of the 1980s and prereform 1990s. However, bureaucratic churning, gate-keeping,
and other forms of service rationing in the initial years of the
reforms kept low-income women from receiving many of the
supports for which they were eligible (Brauner & Loprest,
1999; Corcoran, Danziger, Kalil, & Seefeldt, 2000; Dion &
Pavetti, 2000; Primus et al., 1999; U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1999; Zedlewski & Gruber, 2001). An Illinois leaver
study that tracked women who left welfare showed that only
40 percent of leavers with childcare costs received help with
childcare after leaving (see also Illinois Welfare News, 2000),
only 47 percent had Medicaid coverage six to eight months
after exit, and 44 percent of welfare leavers experienced food
shortages six to eight months after exit (Halter & Anderson,
2000). Another Chicago survey found high levels of hardship
amongst working and non-working leavers, including the inability to meet basic expenses. These hardships were especially high amongst disciplinary cancellations (Work, Welfare, &
Families, 2000).
These data suggest that churning low-income mothers
and children off the welfare rolls in the initial years of welfare
reform produced significant hardship. Conservative commentators argue that caseload reductions, regardless of economic success, point to the moral success of the policy reform.
Rigorous sanctioning has begun to end chronic dependency
and impart valuable moral lessons. Poor women, as Lawrence
Mead argues, "warmly appreciated" the "help and hassle" approach of welfare reform that forced them to change (Mead,
2002). However, these arguments rest on the behaviorist assumption that the sanctioning and administrative case closing
correspond to a particular deviant or immoral behavior in
need of correction-that is, the punitive measure sends a clear
moral message to its target. Administrative case closings,
however, were predominantly for technicalities like missed
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appointments (the blame for which in many cases did not fall
on the welfare recipient), a reluctance to comply with child
support enforcement or other invasive requests. And as Cherlin
et al. (2002) demonstrate, disciplinary cancellations meant to
improve moral behavior (e.g., increasing school attendance,
child immunizations, and regular medical check-ups) were a
miniscule percentage of the cancellations. Instead of imparting
comprehensible moral lessons, IDHS used blunt organizational measures to cast off (and keep off) poor women with little
regard for individual need.
As Moffitt (2008) concedes, if cancellations target the most
disadvantaged women who "cannot organize their lives sufficiently to comply with the rules" (p. 18), then the result would
likely be increased hardship rather than a helpful dose of
tough love. Several studies have found that in fact the most
disadvantaged were the most likely to be sanctioned or cancelled (Cherlin et al., 2002; Pavetti & Bloom, 2001; U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000). The NCPL notes that the "illiterate
... those without reliable mail delivery, the mentally ill or deficient, persons with disabilities in Chicago" are "the most likely
not to receive or respond properly to paper notices of meetings and activities, and they are the least able to cope successfully with the bureaucracy to obtain a prompt reinstatement
of benefits." In that vein, the Chicago area had a much higher
proportion of cancellations for "non-compliance" than downstate counties for each fiscal year, indicating that bureaucratic
churning was more intense in high minority and disadvantaged population areas (IDHS, 2000). An Illinois survey found
that Chicago area leavers were three times as likely to cite an
administrative case discontinuation as downstate respondents
(Julnes et al., 2000). Corroborating this point, Schram, Soss,
Fording, and Houser (2009) recently found, using experimental evidence, that caseworkers are far more likely to punish
African American benefits recipients for the exact same infractions committed by non-African Americans.
So, rather than Mead's tough love, "new paternalism" that
sternly but fairly instilled a sense of personal responsibility
and self-sufficiency into the deviant poor, the post-PRWORA
welfare system in its decisive initial phases shed clients, rationed
services, and changed the norms and expectations of welfare
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receipt through bureaucratic churning, gate-keeping, and
other organizational mechanisms. Some low-income women
shed from TANF found decent jobs and perhaps learned the
moral lessons laid out in the legislation. More often, disadvantaged mothers who had been dropped from the rolls ended up
in irregular, low-wage work or unemployed and disconnected
from state assistance. While stunning caseload reduction goals
have been achieved, there is little evidence that the motivating
moral vision of welfare reform-to change the character and
to improve the circumstances of the poor-has been reached.
Indeed, my argument suggests that given the organizational
dynamics set in motion by PRWORA at the street-level, such
goals were an impossibility from the beginning.
Conclusion
PRWORA initiated a redefinition of the goals of the state
welfare system in Illinois and a concomitant reorganization
of its incentive structure. IDHS, local area welfare offices, and
community-based welfare-to-work agencies were aligned
in their interest to push welfare recipients quickly through
welfare-to-work channels and off the rolls and to limit new
entries to TANF. As a result, an unprecedented number of poor
women left welfare in the first three years of TANF implementation. Using IDHS statistics and ethnographic fieldwork, this
article questions claims made by IDHS and others that former
welfare recipients moved toward economic self-sufficiency
and out of poverty as a result of the reforms. Policy ideals
and political rhetoric about instilling personal responsibility
and other work-related values were in essence meaningless to
IDHS, local offices, and CBOs, which were concerned narrowly with meeting caseload reduction quotas, work participation
requirements, and "billing out" goals-objectives that had to
be met in order to maintain funding and political legitimacy.
These objectives constituted the "abridged map" that the TANF
implementing bodies utilized to simplify the complex reality
of the welfare poor in order to make them legible targets of
policy reform.
Passed in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, TANF reauthorization has given street-level implementing bodies more
tools with which to reduce caseloads. It narrowed further the
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activities and number of hours in job search that count toward
weekly work requirements. And with time limits approaching for more welfare recipients, states can chum off more poor
women from the roles depending on how they employ exemptions and extensions. Bureaucratic procedures and street-level
discretion, therefore, will continue to play a central role in determining the well-being of poor women and children, and
therefore ought to be subject to further scrutiny. Prevailing approaches to studying caseload decline, my analysis contends,
systematically understate the impact of important policyrelated factors like bureaucratic churning because they do not,
and likely cannot, measure them.
Further, this analysis suggests we ask the broader question
of whether the modern state ought to use its power in such
ambitious and invasive attempts to fundamentally transform
"every nook and cranny of the social order" (Scott, 1998, p. 92),
whether towards a liberal or conservative ideal. While ambitious policies of reengineering and planning have produced
many marvels of the modem age, those that seek to change the
human person in fundamental ways ask the state to do something that it is ill-equipped to do, and likely attempts with disastrous results.
Acknowledgement: The title is inspired by George C. Homans'
"Bringing men back in," published in 1964 in the American
Sociological Review.
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